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THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY CHANGE ON INSIDER TRADING PROFITABILITY: 
SOME EARLY EVIDENCE FROM NEW ZEALAND 
  
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper adds to the scant literature on the tightening of regulations and its impact 
on the profitability of insider trades by examining the effects of the recent enactment 
of the Securities Market Amendment Act 2002 in New Zealand. We investigate the 
abnormal returns around the date of insider transactions both before and after the 
introduction of this Act. We find that the number of insider transactions decreased 
just prior to the introduction of the Act; further we observe a marked reduction in 
profitability of directors. However, the difference between the pre and post-change 
returns lacks statistical significance.  
 
JEL Codes : G38, G14 
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INTRODUCTION 
Insider trading remains a contentious issue in both the finance and law literature as it 
has both harmful and beneficial impacts on the market. While the quick dispersal of 
the information that an insider uses to trade on improves the informational efficiency 
and resource allocation of the market, the possibility of trading against a better 
informed party reduces participation in the market by outside investors with flow on 
effects on the economy as a whole. In practise, countries have tended to allow some 
insider trading as a necessary evil. This is achieved by implementing laws that allow 
the most beneficial insider trading and prohibit the most harmful. According to 
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002), insider trading has been regulated in over 80% of 
countries with a capital market. However, even legal trading can be damaging as 
insiders expropriate trading gains at the expense of uninformed outsiders. This raises 
questions about the efficacy of insider trading regulations allowing some trading 
given insider share dealings have been shown to be profitable regardless of legal 
structure. Studies have failed to detect that the tightening of the laws governing 
insider transactions has had a positive effect on legal insider trading profitability.  
 
The profitability of insider trading has been almost uniformly established. 
Starting with Lorrie and Neiderhofer (1968), numerous papers have examined insider 
trading profitability. In the US studies such as Jaffe (1974a), Finnerty (1976), Seyhun 
(1986, 1998), Rozeff and Zaman (1988) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) have all 
found that insiders earn significantly higher returns following their purchases and 
avoided losses following their sales. These papers have been supported in a variety 
of other markets including Canada (Baesel and Stein, 1979), Spain (Del Brio, Miguel 
and Perote, 2002), Poland (Wisniewski and Bohl, 2004), New Zealand (Etebari, 
Tourani-Rad and Gilbert, 2003) and the U.K. (Pope, Morris and Peel, 1990; 
Friederich, Gregory, Matatko and Tonks, 2002). Only scant contrary evidence exists 
to suggest insiders cannot trade profitably based predominantly on Eckbo and Smith 
(1998) who examined the Oslo Stock Exchange. These papers cover a broad cross-
section of markets, sample periods and regulatory regimes, yet in virtually every 
study insiders have been able to earn abnormal returns.  
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These studies also provide some indirect evidence on the effectiveness of the 
tightening of regulations on insider trading profitability. In the US, various papers 
have examined this issue over a long period of time, almost continual coverage from 
the early 1960’s through to 1995, encompassing several periods of marked changes 
in the laws, including increased sanctions and an increase in the will to prosecute by 
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). Despite the laws being strengthened on 
several occasions Lakonishok and Lee (2001), one of the most recent US studies, 
still found insiders trade before price increases and sell prior to price decreases 
resulting in significant returns. Their results suggest that the changes in the laws 
have achieved little to make legal insider trading unprofitable.  
 
Several papers have specifically examined the impact of regulatory changes 
on insider trading profitability. Jaffe (1974b) was the first to explore this issue in the 
US by calculating cumulative abnormal returns earned by insiders over the period 
1962-1968. The study focused on the profits earned and volume traded before and 
after several court cases which were argued as having a major impact on the 
enforcement of insider trading. The decisions, the Cady, Roberts decision, the Texas 
Gulf Sulphur indictment and Texas Gulf Sulphur decision, were argued to 
demonstrate a new will to prosecute as well as extending the definition of insider. 
However, these decisions, either individually or cumulatively, were found to have no 
significant impact on the profitability or the volume traded.  
 
The findings of Jaffe (1974b) are supported by Seyhun (1992) who examined 
the profitability of insider trading around major changes in the insider trading laws 
that occurred in the US in the 1980’s. The early years of the 1980’s in particular saw 
a much higher expected cost of insider trading due to rapid incremental increases in 
the potential penalties and greater vigilance by the SEC. Despite these massive 
changes to enforcement, Seyhun (1992) found that insider trading actually became 
more lucrative between the period prior to 1980 and that following 1984. This was 
also accompanied by a dramatic increase in the volume traded. The paper did find 
that court rulings impacted on insider trading in terms of dissuading insiders from 
trading before earnings announcements and takeovers. The author concluded that 
the involvement of the courts gave insiders too much certainty in what was and was 
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not covered by the laws. This allowed them to trade more profitably on legal 
information, avoiding the increased sanctions and vigilance.  
 
In both studies the focus of the change in regulations was the tightening of the 
enforcement regime. In Jaffe (1974b) this was an increase in the possibility of 
prosecution and a broadening in the definition of who was covered, whereas Seyhun 
(1992) tested the effect of improvements in enforcement involving both higher 
sanctions and the greater possibility of prosecution. However, both studies examined 
this impact on enforcement against the profitability of legal insider trading rather than 
illegal trading, an aspect that is more likely to be affected by improvements in 
enforcement. This is borne out to a degree by Seyhun (1992) who notes that the law 
changes were not aimed at legal insider trading. This raises the question of whether 
regulatory changes targeted specifically at legal insider trading will have more effect 
on reducing the profits earned by insiders than has been evidenced to date in the 
US.  
 
The New Zealand market provides a prime opportunity to examine this issue 
due to the recent enactment of the Securities Market Amendment Act 2002. This act 
was introduced to address weaknesses in the previous regulations governing both 
legal and illegal insider trading. In particular, two key deficiencies were addressed by 
the new laws. The first was the perceived weakness in the enforcement regime. 
Under the previous rules enforcement was the domain of the company in which the 
trading occurred or the other party to a trade against an insider. This meant that 
insider trading cases could only be pursued by those with little access to the 
information required to make a case. The weakness in this system was compounded 
by allowing the other party to the trade to only pursue a case for the value of the loss 
they as an individual suffered. This meant taking a case was extremely uneconomical 
given the loss often would be far less than the expected cost of the prosecution. As a 
result of this system, in the 14 years that the old rules operated there was not a 
single successful prosecution for insider trading. 
 
The other weakness addressed was the disclosure regime. Under the old 
rules only substantial shareholders, those with more than 5% of the voting stock, 
were required to disclose within 5 working days. Directors were not required to 
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divulge details of their trade until the annual report was published, a delay of 9-10 
months on average (Etebari et al., 2003). Executives, those Seyhun (1998) states 
have the best access to information and therefore could earn the largest profits, were 
not required to disclose at all, provided they did not fall in either the director or 
substantial shareholder categories. This delay in disclosure in New Zealand resulted 
in ongoing opportunities to profit by insiders who could continue to trade for a 
prolonged period of time before the market could observe their information and adjust 
the price to remove this information asymmetry. Huddart, Hughes and Levine (2001) 
argue that delays in disclosure could theoretically allow insiders to earn significantly 
higher profits. This was supported empirically by Etebari et al. (2003) who examined 
the profitability of delayed versus immediate disclosures in New Zealand prior to the 
introduction of the new laws. They found those able to delay their disclosures earned 
significantly greater returns than those required to disclose immediately. It was 
argued that the new laws being introduced at the time could therefore result in a 
reduction in profitability of directors transactions.  
 
This paper builds on the findings of Etebari et al. (2003) by examining whether 
the prediction of a decrease in the profitability of directors has held true following the 
introduction of the new laws. The amendment of the regulations in New Zealand 
provide a good opportunity to add to the literature on the impact of regulations by 
examining changes that are targeted at the profits of legal insider trading. This is in 
contrast to the works of Jaffe (1974b) and Seyhun (1992) who examined law 
changes whose effects were primarily aimed at illegal insider trading. If the laws in 
New Zealand have had the effect expected we should observe a strong reduction in 
the profits of insiders between transactions that occurred prior to the introduction of 
the new laws and those that were undertaken following the changes.  
 
We employ a sample of 1489 transactions conducted between January 1996 
and December 2003 in companies listed on the New Zealand Exchange. The 
profitability of these transactions is tested using a market adjusted model. The 
abnormal returns for various event windows within the test period of -50,50 days 
around the trade are examined. The transactions were separated, based on when 
the trade occurred, into one of three sub-samples, the pre-change, change and post-
change. The difference between the pre and post-change groups was then tested to 
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observe whether the law changes had been effective in reducing the abnormal 
returns of insiders. The results show that there were fewer trades in the period 
immediately prior to and following the new Act’s introduction. Further, there is some 
evidence, albeit not statistically significant, indicating a reduction in the profitability of 
insider trading.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the sample 
and methodology employed in this paper. Section 3 provides the empirical findings 
and their discussion and Section 4 concludes.  
 
SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
To examine the impact of changes in regulations on the profitability of insider trades 
we employ a sample of 89 companies that have been listed on the New Zealand 
Exchange (NZX) between January 1996 and December 2003. For each company we 
collect information on all disclosed directors transactions that occurred over the 
sample period. We examine only directors’ transactions as there was no real change 
in the rules applying to substantial shareholders as they were required to disclose in 
a timely fashion under the old laws. Further, executives were not subjected to 
mandatory disclosure requirements under the old law making the profitability of their 
trading before the changes impossible to gauge. Directors by contrast are affected by 
the recent regulatory changes and their gains can be examined in both periods 
making their transactions suitable for establishing the impact of the new regime. 
Directors’ transactions, prior to the introduction of the new laws, were collected from 
the company annual reports, the only place they were disclosed, while after the law 
change we obtained information on the trades from the disclosures filed with the New 
Zealand Exchange. Information on the position within the firm of the insider was 
taken from the annual report while market capitalisation and price information was 
gathered from Thompson Financials DataStream database.  
 
To examine the impact of the law changes on the profitability of insider trading 
we use an event study methodology. We calculate the profitability of insider trading in 
three periods, the pre change period covering transactions that occurred between 
January 1996 and December 2001, the post change period encompassing 
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transactions that occurred between December 2002 and December 2003 and the 
change period, transactions that occurred between January 2002 and November 
2002. We separate out the change period to isolate any potential bias caused by the 
Securities Market Amendment Bill 2002 passage through the legislative process.  
 
 
Panel A: Breakdown of Transactions
Number of Transactions per year
Aggregate Purchases Sales
1996 244 114 130
1997 213 124 89
1998 246 154 92
1999 222 126 96
2000 217 124 93
2001 126 75 51
Change Period 75 56 19
Post Period 146 93 53
Total 1489 866 623
Firms with at least one trade
89 82 61
Transactions by Position
Pre Change Period
Managing Director 205 130 75
Chairman 173 85 88
Director 890 502 388
Change Period
Managing Director 10 6 4
Chairman 8 5 3
Director 57 45 12
Post Change Period
Managing Director 18 10 8
Chairman 20 14 6
Director 108 69 39  
 
Table 1: Transaction Breakdown and Summary Statistics 
 
Note: The Pre Change spans January 1996 to December 2001. The Change 
Period spans from January 2002 until November 2002. Post Change spans 
December 2002 until December 2003. 
 
Table 1 gives a breakdown of the insider transactions, the sample consists of 
1489 transactions (866 purchases and 623 sales). Unlike studies from the US and 
UK, we find fewer sales than purchases, largely due to the fact that there is limited 
use of managerial stock options in New Zealand as compensation. The breakdown of 
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transactions by years also shows that prior to 2001 there were typically in excess of 
200 director trades a year. In the years since 2001 this has decreased markedly with 
the numbers finally picking up again in the post period. This could be a reaction to 
the proposed introduction of the new insider trading laws. One possible explanation 
is that insiders may have voluntarily reduced their number of trades in an effort to 
forestall the introduction of the new laws. With the amendments in place the need for 
circumspection has ended resulting in the increase of insider trades in the post 
change period although the numbers are still lower than observed prior to 2001. This 
could be due to either less information driven trading as a result of the new Act or 
some residual uncertainty about the effect of the changes with insiders continuing to 
play it safe. Whether this is a permanent change remains to be seen. 
 
When the trades are broken down by the insiders position within the company, 
it can be seen that directors typically undertake the most trades followed by 
managing directors and chairmen who have similar levels of trading. In percentage 
terms the largest reduction in trading however has occurred in the managing 
directors sub-sample who have gone from an average of 34 trades per year in the 
pre-change period to 18 in the post change period, a reduction of nearly half. 
Chairmen have experienced a smaller reduction in trades followed by directors who 
reduced the number of their transactions least. This is in line with the information 
hierarchy proposed by Seyhun (1998) and tentatively suggests that in the short run at 
least there has been a greater reduction in the number of trades by those with the 
greatest access to information, although a larger sample over a long period is 
needed to fully ascertain this.  
 
We calculate the profitability of the transactions using a market adjusted 
model in the form: 
 
tmtiti RRAR ,,, −=   (1) 
 
Where Ri is the return of company i and Rm is the return on the NZSE40 capital 
index. This index represents 98% of the market capitalisation of the NZX making it a 
suitable proxy for the market portfolio. We calculate the profitability over various 
 8
event windows within the test period -50,50 by calculating cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) in the form: 
 
∑
=
=
2
1
21 ),(
t
tt
tARttCAR   (2) 
  
The CARs were then aggregated for all trades. Sales transaction CARs are 
multiplied by -1 in the process of aggregation to account for the fact that a decrease 
in returns following the sale represents the loss avoided by the insider. This measure 
of sales is used in all the testing.  
 
We calculate the significance of the returns using a bootstrap methodology 
which was introduced by Efron (1979) and applied in the context of event studies by 
Foster, Olsen and Shelvin (1984) and Wisniewski and Bohl (2004). The procedure is 
relatively robust to the problems of non-normality, heteroscedasticity and time 
dependence of security returns as it avoids many distributional assumptions of 
parametric tests (Kramer, 2001). This testing was conducted by randomly selecting a 
replacement firm-date pair from the entire population of companies and dates to 
match each of the insider purchases and sales from our initial sample. The 
cumulative abnormal returns following each of these random events were then 
computed for the respective event windows and aggregated. This process was 
repeated 2000 times to develop the distribution. The null is rejected at the α percent 
level if the abnormal return from the insider trading sample exceeds (1−α)*2,000 
simulated values from the empirical distribution.  
 
The significance of the difference between the profitability in the pre and post 
change periods was calculated using the formula: 
 
m
S
n
S
xxt s
2
2
2
1
1 )(
+
−=   (3) 
 
where 11 * ARnS σ= , 22 * ARmS σ=   
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Table 2 reports the sample cross correlations between the variables employed 
in this paper. The results show a significantly negative relationship between market 
value, MV, and managing directors, MD. This implies that managing directors are 
less likely to trade in larger companies. This is consistent with the idea that larger 
companies are the subject of greater scrutiny resulting in less information asymmetry 
and therefore opportunities to profit.  
 
 
Change MV MD CH
Post -0.0750 0.0138 -0.0314 0.0048
(0.1156) (0.6453) (0.3628) (0.8710)
Change 0.0200 -0.0118 -0.0326
(0.5158) (0.6986) (0.3490)
MV -0.1188 -0.0123
(0.0553) (0.6876)
MD 0.1689
(0.0310)  
Table 2: Sample Cross Correlations 
 
Note: p-values are reported in the parentheses. Post is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 for the months December 2002-December 2003. Change is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 for the months between January 2002 and 
November 2002. MV is the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation. MD 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 when a transaction is undertaken by a 
managing director or CEO. CH is a dummy variable that equals 1 when a 
transaction is undertaken by the Chairman of the board of directors. 
 
RESULTS 
The theoretical model of Huddart et al. (2001) predicts that the requirement to 
disclose in a timely fashion should have a significant effect on the profitability of 
insider trades. The literature has shown almost uniformly that insider trading is 
profitable, while studies specifically examining the effect of changes in insider trading 
laws on profitability have found little impact. Jaffe (1974b) and Seyhun (1992) both 
concluded that tighter regulations had at best a minimal impact on insider trading.  
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Panel A: Aggregate Sample CARs 
Windows CARs CARs CARs
0,1 0.0024 0.0097 * -0.0034 0.4179
0,5 0.0048 * -0.0007 0.0003 0.3173
0,10 0.0074 * 0.0059 0.0004 0.5044
0,20 0.0139 *** 0.0006 0.0093 ** 0.3311
0,50 0.0272 *** 0.0200 ** 0.0201 ** 0.5122
-50,50 0.0122 * -0.0134 -0.0029 1.0777
Panel B: Purchase Sample CARs
Windows CARs CARs CARs
0,1 0.0028 0.0107 * -0.0051 0.4224
0,5 0.0044 -0.0041 -0.0062 0.5773
0,10 0.0059 0.0046 -0.0082 0.7643
0,20 0.0132 ** -0.0088 0.0025 0.5784
0,50 0.0271 *** 0.0155 ** 0.0151 * 0.6472
-50,50 0.0294 *** -0.0160 -0.0212 2.7314 ***
Panel C: Sale Sample CARs
Windows CARs CARs CARs
0,1 0.0022 0.0066 -0.0004 0.1248
0,5 0.0054 0.0094 0.0119 -0.3051
0,10 0.0099 0.0097 0.0155 -0.2646
0,20 0.0155 * 0.0285 * 0.0213 ** -0.2719
0,50 0.0293 ** 0.0332 0.0288 * 0.0218
-50,50 -0.0080 -0.0056 0.0292 ** -1.7466 *
t-stat difference
Pre-Change Change Post-Change 
Pre-Change Change Post-Change 
Pre-Change Change Post-Change 
t-stat difference
t-stat difference
 
Table 3: Insider CARs and Average Volume 
 
Note: *** Significant at 1%,  ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
Abnormal returns were calculated using the market adjusted model. The 
significance level was assessed using the bootstrap methodology employing 
2000 iterations. Pre Change includes the 1268 transactions (717 purchases 
and 551 sales) that occurred between January 1996 and December 2001. 
Change includes the 79 transactions (56 purchases and 19 sales) that 
occurred between January 2002 and November 2002. Post Change includes 
the 146 transactions (93 purchases and 53 sales) that occurred between 
December 2002 and December 2003.  
 
 
 
The results in Table 3 provide evidence on the profitability in both the pre and 
post-change periods in New Zealand. As can be seen in Panel A, the aggregate 
sample provides evidence that the regulatory changes have had an impact on insider 
trading profitability but the effect is not strong. Pre-change insiders experience 
significant cumulative abnormal returns within 5 days of their trade, eventually 
earning a premium of 2.72% above the market over the first 50 days. The results for 
post-change show that insiders earn .7% less over the 0,50 day window and that the 
significance of the CARs is delayed until the 0,20 day window. The delayed 
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significance of post-change trades may indicate a change in the trading behaviour of 
insiders. Insiders may be increasing the time delay between their trades and 
upcoming disclosures in an attempt to avoid the increased scrutiny of regulators. This 
could account for the delayed significance observed in Table 3 and the sharp jump in 
CARs in Figure 1, 15-20 days following the transaction. The post-change CARs 
increase at a slower rate than those for pre-change trades until this point at which 
point the rate of increase appears to be similar. Insiders still earn a statistically 
significant return of 2.01% over the market in the first 50 days. The post-change 
patterns can also be observed in the change period where insiders earn similar 
CARs which become significant in the same event window. This suggests there has 
been some pre-emption of the effects of the new laws.  
 
 
-0.03
-0.025
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
-50 -45 -40 -35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Pre Change Post Change  
 
Figure 1: -50,50 Day CARs for the Aggregate Sample 
 
Note: The vertical axis represents the cumulative abnormal returns based on a market adjusted 
model. Sales transactions CARs were multiplied by -1 before aggregation. The pre-change 
sample contains 1268 transactions that occurred prior to January 2001. The post-change sample 
contains 146 transactions that occurred after 1 December 2002. 
 
 
Another point of interest is the change in the timing of insider trades in relation to 
the pre-trade price performance of the stocks. The greatest difference in returns is 
over the -50,50 day event window where pre-change insider transactions earn 1.22% 
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while post-change trades make -.29%. As can be seen in Figure 1 this is a result of 
insiders in the post-change sample trading after a much greater drop in the CAR. In 
fact at Day 0 post-change trade companies have suffered twice the decrease in 
price, approximately 2.5% versus 1.3%. This suggests that insiders have switched to 
a more long-term contrarian investment strategy based on price movements caused 
by market misvaluation which has the advantage of reducing the risk of a prosecution 
for insider trading.  
 
While the CARs for the aggregate sub-sample show a decrease of .7% in the 
change and post-change trades and there appears to be evidence of a change in the 
behaviour of insiders, the t-stats of the difference between the pre and post-change 
periods are insignificant. None of the event windows demonstrate a significant 
reduction in CARs despite the large decrease in CARs apparent over many of the 
event windows. The results therefore suggest that while there has been a reduction 
in the profitability it is not as prominent, providing limited support for the belief that 
the regulatory change has had a significant impact on the abnormal returns earned 
by insiders.   
 
Panels B and C report the results where the sample is separated into purchases 
and sales. Not all sales are information driven transactions as insiders may sell for 
diversification or liquidity needs. As the new regime should affect information driven 
transactions most, we separate out the sample to see whether there is a difference in 
the impact of the new laws. The results in Panel B report the CARs for the purchase 
sub-sample. In the pre-change period insiders expropriate abnormal returns of 
2.71%. The change and post-change transactions earn significant returns for the 
0,50 day event window of just 1.55% and 1.51% respectively, a reduction of about 
1.2%. These large decreases appear to be largely responsible for the aggregate 
sample results, supporting the idea that the changes would have the greatest impact 
on information driven trades.  
 
Figure 2 also reveals similar patterns in timing to those for the aggregate sample. 
Again there is a significant difference in the pre-trade CARs with the pre-change 
transactions showing no signs of significant movement prior to the trade. Post-
change on the other hand experience a steady decrease in CAR over the 50 days 
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prior to the trade. This presents even stronger evidence of insiders switching to 
relying on mispricing in the share price to profit. Figure 2 also shows why there is 
such a long delay in the CARs becoming significant as the CARs do not start to 
increase for approximately 15 days following the trade. This is again similar to the 
pattern observed for the aggregate sample where the significance appeared 
dependent on a sharp increase in the returns around day 15.  
 
 
-0.06
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
-50 -45 -40 -35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Pre Change Post Change  
 
Figure 2: -50,50 Day CARs for the Purchase Sample 
 
Note: The vertical axis represents the cumulative abnormal returns based on a market adjusted 
model. The pre-change sample contains 717 transactions that occurred prior to January 2001. The 
post-change sample contains 93 transactions that occurred after 1 December 2002. 
 
 
Despite the reduction in CARs of over 1% and the very different patterns in the 
CARs both before and after the trade, the t-stat of the difference is still insignificant. 
Only in the -50,50 time period is the difference great enough to produce large t-stats, 
caused largely by insiders switching to a more contrarian style of investing. As with 
the aggregate sample the evidence suggests that although insiders display evidence 
of better timing and their trades earn smaller CARs, the difference in returns are 
insignificantly different. 
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Panel C reports the results for the sales sub-sample. Unlike the aggregate and 
purchase samples there is little evidence of an improvement following the 
introduction of the new law for sales. The pre and post change results are very 
similar at 2.93% and 2.88% respectively which is supported by low t-stats of the 
difference. The returns also become significant at the same point, during the 0,20 
event window. Only the -50,50 event window is significantly different although in this 
case it is the pre-change which demonstrates superior timing. Figure 3 shows the two 
samples are comparable up until about 20 days prior to the trade. While the pre-
change CARs continue to decrease, they start to increase for the post-change. The 
insignificant impact of the regulatory changes on sales however is likely a result of 
the fact that most of the sales are not information driven transactions. As explained in 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) insiders can sell for a number of reasons including 
liquidity needs and diversification. Tourani-Rad and Gilbert (2004) also found that 
only a very small number of sales were timed to take advantage of bad news 
announcements although sales were still profitable. It may be that the high number of 
non-informational trades has allowed insiders to camouflage information driven 
trades more successfully than purchases.  
 
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
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0
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Figure 3: -50,50 Day CARs for the Sales Sample 
 
Note: The vertical axis represents the cumulative abnormal returns based on a market adjusted model. All 
transactions CARs were multiplied by -1. The pre-change sample contains 551 transactions that occurred prior to 
January 2001. The post-change sample contains 53 transactions that occurred after 1 December 2002. 
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Aggregate Sample Purchase Sample Sales Sample
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Constant 0.0268 *** 0.0276 *** 0.0728 *** 0.0260 *** 0.0271 *** 0.0652 *** 0.0278 *** 0.0283 *** 0.0844 ***
(0.0045) (0.0047) (0.0161) (0.0058) (0.0062) (0.0216) (0.0071) (0.0072) (0.0247)
Post -0.0067 -0.0076 -0.0059 -0.0109 -0.0120 -0.0091 -0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0044
(0.0088) (0.0089) (0.0087) (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.0103) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0163)
Change -0.0077 -0.0053 -0.0116 -0.0114 0.0049 0.0104
(0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0194) (0.0209)
MV -0.0087 *** -0.0069 ** -0.0115 ***
(0.0025) (0.0032) (0.0042)
MD 0.0162 0.0012 0.0407
(0.0140) (0.0164) (0.0258)
CH 0.0268 *** 0.0227 0.0283 ***
(0.0102) (0.0145) (0.0146)
Observations 1489 1489 1489 866 866 866 623 623 623
R-Squared 0.02% 0.02% 1.99% 0.05% 0.08% 1.12% 0.00% 0.02% 3.89%  
 
Table 4: Regression Model Results 
 
Note: *** Significant at 1%,  ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Post is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the months December 2002-December 2003. Change is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 for the months between January 2002 and November 2002. MV is the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation. MD is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 when a transaction is undertaken by a managing director or CEO. CH is a dummy variable that equals 1 when a transaction is 
undertaken by the Chairman of the board of directors. 
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We also check the impact of the regime change on insider profitability by 
employing regression analysis. Table 4 presents the results of the regressions of the 
0,50 day CARs against a number of explanatory variables. Models 1, 4 and 7 regress 
insiders profits against a dummy that equals 1 for those transactions that occur in the 
post-change period. Models 2, 5 and 8 add to the previous models a dummy for 
transactions that occur during the change period while Models 3, 6 and 9 add in three 
dependent variables; the firm size, MV, and two dummies for the insiders position 
within the company, MD and CH. Numerous studies have found that insiders in larger 
companies earn smaller profits, largely due to the heightened media attentions and 
coverage which reduces the information asymmetry in those firms. Lakinshok and 
Lee (2001) and Seyhun (1998) have also found that the position of insiders can have 
a large impact on the profitability of their transactions with managing directors and 
chairmen earning higher profits due to better access to information.  
 
The results again suggest that the law changes have reduced the profitability 
of insider trading but have failed to the have the significant impact expected. In all 
models the relationship between the profits earned by insiders and the Post variable 
is negative but insignificant. This supports the results in Table 3 which found 
reductions, albeit small ones in the case of sales, in the CARs of insiders following 
the introduction of the new Act. It is also interesting to note that the Change variable 
is also negative in the aggregate and purchase sample models suggesting that the 
slight effect on insider profitability occurred prior to the law change. As expected, the 
regressions results show a significantly negative relationship between insiders profits 
and MV. Only trades by chairmen, CH, are important in terms of insiders position and 
only for the aggregate and sales sub-samples although it is close to significant for the 
purchase sample. The results therefore suggest that the profits expropriated by 
insiders are smaller in large companies, likely due to less information asymmetry, 
and that chairmen are better at timing their sales than other insiders.  
 
The results show that the new Act has had some impact but that the effects 
have been smaller than expected. The difference in CARs, while reasonably large in 
economic terms for the aggregate (.7%) and purchase sub-samples (1.2%), are 
insignificantly different between the pre and post-change periods. The purchase and 
aggregate trades also suggest a change in the trading patterns of insiders with the 
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transactions appearing to be based on a more contrarian investment strategy. 
Further, the significance occurs much later, suggesting insiders are trading earlier to 
avoid regulatory scrutiny. The sales CARs are almost identical in both the pre and 
post-change periods with only the pre-trade returns causing any difference in the 
samples. These results are fully supported by the regressions which show 
insignificant negative relationships between the 0,50 CARs and the Post dummy. 
While the results suggest only a marginal impact on profitability, they are in line with 
Jaffe (1974b) and Seyhun (1992) who both found little or no positive effect from 
tightened insider trading laws.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
While the debate on the merits of insider trading is ongoing, the vast majority of 
countries have chosen to impose restrictions in the hope of maximising the benefits 
of insider trading and minimising the harm from it. The most visible aspect of insider 
trading, the profitability of the trades, has been well researched and almost 
universally established. However the impact of regulations on the expropriated profits 
has only been the subject of minimal research restricted almost solely to the US. The 
scant evidence on this topic, in addition to other anecdotal findings, suggests that 
regulations do not reduce the profitability of insider trades. Seyhun (1992) even 
concluded that the tighter enforcement regime of the 1980’s increased the abnormal 
returns accruing to insiders. This paper seeks to add to the literature by focusing on 
the experiences of a market with different legal structure. Further, the law changes 
considered are likely to more directly impact on legal rather than illegal insider 
trading, as was the case in Seyhun (1992) and Jaffe (1974b).  
 
We examined the impact that the recently enacted Securities Market 
Amendment Act 2002 has had on the profitability of directors’ trades in companies 
listed on the New Zealand Exchange. Transactions were separated into three 
samples; pre-change which included transactions between January 1996 and 
December 2001, change which contained trades between January 2002 and 
November 2002 and the post-change sample which encompassed share dealings 
between December 2002 and December 2003. A market adjusted model with a test 
period -50,50 was employed to calculate the profitability of each sample which was 
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then compared to determine the effect of the new laws. A decrease in director share 
dealings in the period prior to the introduction of the act was observed with a small 
increase following its enactment. The results also showed that CARs were smaller for 
the change and post-change aggregate sample although this was largely driven by 
an economically significant decrease of over 1% in purchase sample CARs. The 
sales however showed no evidence of a decrease and the differences were 
statistically insignificant. Further, the regressions showed a negative but statistically 
insignficant relationship between the (0,50) day CARs and the transactions occurring 
in the post change period.  
 
The results therefore suggest that the new laws have had only a marginal 
impact on the profitability of insider trades. It is possible that an examination of a 
longer event period or a sample with more transactions post change may find a more 
marked decrease in profitability although this will require more time to pass before 
such testing can be conducted. It is also possible that the full impact of the changes 
in the laws has yet to be established. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) found that it 
took the first enforcement of insider trading laws before a reduction in the cost of 
capital was experienced. This may prove to be the case in New Zealand, with the 
market requiring a demonstration of the political will and ability to enforce the new 
rules before the full effect of the changes are experienced. It should also be noted 
that while this paper has found that the new laws have had only a marginal impact on 
profitability, the new regime is likely to have effects on other areas in addition to 
abnormal returns. Before the new regulations can be written off as ineffective their 
impact on market microstructure elements such as liquidity, bid-ask spreads and the 
cost of capital must be established. It may be that the new laws have had a larger 
impact on illegal insider trading, as shown by those factors, than it had on disclosed 
share dealings.  
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